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taxation of corporate income is the disincentive to incorporate. 
In this paper, we investigate the extent to which the aggregate 
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corporate vs.  noncorporate forms of organization during the 
period 1959-86 has responded to the size of the tax distortion 
discouraging firms from incorporating.  In theory,  profitable 
firms should shift out of the corporate sector when the tax 
distortion to incorporating is larger, and conversely for firms 
with tax losses.  Our empirical results provide strong support 
for these theoretical forecasts, and hold consistently across a 
wide variety of specifications and measures of the tax variables. 
Measured effects are small, however, throwing doubt on the 
econonic importance of tax-induced changes in organizational 
form. 
Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason  Roger H. Gordon 
Hoover Institution  Department of Economics 
Stanford University  University of Michigan 
Stanford, CA  94305  Ann Arbor, MI  48109-1220 
and NBER  and NEER Taxes and the Choice of Organizational Form 
Jeffrey K. MacKie—Meson 
aod 
Roger H. Gordon 
One of the most basic distortioos created by the double tsxatioo  of  corporate income 
is the disincentive to incorporate. However obvious this distortion may be, most papers 
investigating the distortions created by the corporate tax have taken as exogenous a firm's 
choice whether or not to incorporate, assuming for example that some industries are in- 
herently corporate while others are inherently noncorporate, A variety of nontax factors, 
described below, can certainly influence  a firm's choice  of organizational form,  causing 
some to favor incorporating and others not.  Hut are these nontax factors so dominant 
that taxes do not in practice influence a firm's choice of  organizational  form?  As Cravelle 
and  Kotlikoff  (1989,1990)  emphasize,  tax—induced changes in firms  choices  of organiza- 
tional form in principle can create large excess burdens.  The size of these distortions in 
practice depends on the extent to which  firms respond to these tax incentives. 
In this paper, we calculate how the tax distortion discouraging  firms  from  incorporating 
has varied over time, then estimate the extent to which the allocation  of assets and  taxable 
income between corporate vs.  noncorporate forms of organization  has slufted  in response 
to this time—varying tax distortion. We do this using aggregate  data, by industry, in the 
U.S. during the period 1959—86. 
In theory, taxes should induce profitable firms to shift out of the corporate sector when 
the tax distortion to incorporating increases,  and conversely for firms with tax losses. Our 
empirical results provide strong support for these theoretical forecasts, and bold consis- 
tently across a wide variety of specifications  and measures of the tax variables. We also 
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between various forms. 
Tue measured effects are small,  however, throwing doubt on the economic importance 
of tax—induced  changes  in organizational form.  For instance, cutting the tax ratc  on 
noncorporate incomo  by .10 is forecasted to cause no morc than one—half of one percent 
of total assets to shift out of corporate form.'  The effect is larger for the location of 
taxable gains and losses,  with the same tax change leading to a shift of approximately 
5% of galns and losses  toward the more favored forms of organization.  Overall, nontax 
determinants of organizational  form appear to dominate, though further research will he 
needed to determine wluch factors are most important. 
In the first section of the paper we examine theoretically how the tax law distorts a 
firm's choice of organizational  form.  Not only do tax rates differ by organizational form, 
but a variety of other tax provisions  can also affect a firm's choice.  We also discuss some 
non—tax factors that are believed to affect the choice of organizational form. 
In the second section, we present the results of our empirical analysis. In particular, 
we examine the movement  of economic  activity across  organizational forms in the U.S. 
as tax rates and other tax rules have changed  during the period  1959—1986.  Our two 
primary measures of  economic resources and activity are book assets and taxable income. 
We emphasize  that it is important to distinguish between firms with positive income and 
firms with losses; this  distinction is important because many of the incentives are opposite 
for gain and loss firms. 
1.  Theoretical Framework 
.1.1  Model of a Firm's Choice of Organizational  Form 
We begin with a simple model that determines the equilibrium allocation of resources 
across  different organizational forms as a function of tax rates and nun—tax factors.  Fur 
now we leave "other factors" largely unspecified;  we return to them in section 1.3.  For 
As shown below,  to yield the large escess burden simulated by Graselle and KutlikoT (199, 1990) 
requires asset shifts that are nearly  30 times  as large. simplicity, we allow for only  two classes of ownership: one that  is  taxed at both the 
corporate and personal level ("corporate") and another that is taxed only at the personal 
level  ("partnership").  The double—taxation of corporate income  has been the focus of 
studies of dividend payout behavior and corporate debt/equity decisions;  we examine its 
role in the determination of ownership structure. 
When should a firm choose to incorporate?  Assume  that a firm,  if it does not in- 
corporate, would earn economic  income before taxes of I, and taxable income  Ii..  In a 
noncorporate firm, this income is subject to tax only at the personal level.  Denote the 
personal tax rate on this income by r,,..2  The firm's net—of—tax income is therefore ITnIa. 
Lf the firm incorporates, its economic income, again before taxes, can he expressed by 
I+g,  where g captures any non-tax factors that make the corporate  form of  ownership more 
attractive  (g can be negative, and will vary by firm). For simplicity,  let thc' corporation's 
taxable income equal 1 + g, implying that the same definition  of taxable income is used 
for corporate and noncorporate firms, and that the tax law correctly  nicasures the extra 
income, g, generated by incorporation.3  This income is subject to tax first at the corporate 
level, at rate i- Shareholders  in the corporation then face personal income taxes on the 
income  left after corporate taxes4 — dividend  income is taxed at ordinary rates while 
capital gains are taxed at lower rates. The specific  tax rates, of course, vary by investor. 
However, as shown  for example in Gordon and Bradford (1980),  when a firm's equity is 
tradod freely in the financial markets, without constraints, then the implicit personal tax 
rates affecting firm behavior can be expressed  as a weighted average  of the tax rates faced 
2  For a sole proprietorship,  this tax rate simply equals  the iriarginal tax rate of the sok proprietor. For  firms with several  owners, r,, will  equal a weighted average  of the tax rates of each of the ownera 
Taxable  income of a firm that incorporates  may change by a different amount than the change in  its  economic income. For example,  the relative tax treatment of such items as interest  income, capital gains,  fringe benefits, tax losses, and tax preferences, compared  with ordinary incon,e, all differ for corporate vs.  noncorporate firms,  If the amounts of these categories  are fixed,  lien these differences can  be captured  simply  through an  adjustment in the  effective tax rate.  If behavior  changes  in response to these  tax  differences,  however, then extra terms would appear in equation (1) below, reflecting both the tax and  nontax implications  of these changes in behavior.  These  extra terms are  all second-order effects, and so  should  be small relative to the terms we focus on. 
The analysis  woild be  different  in  its  particulars for a fully or partially  integrated  system such as  exists for exaniple in the United Kingdom, but  the qualitative  result that  there are differential taxes across  organizational  forms still holds. 
3 by each individual investor, Let r represent the implicit personsl tax rate per dollar of 
income to equity,  taking as given  the division of this income between dividends vs. capital 
gains.5  The firm's income net of all taxes is therefore 1± g —(Ii +  g)(Ye + (1 
— r0)75). The 
net cost from incorporating therefore equals 
COST = —g(i -  —(1 
— r0)r0)  Ixfre  (I 
—  — r0).  (1) 
In general, this expression (and each tersu) can he of either sign. Theory tells us little 
about the sign or size of p — all we can say is that the greater the nontax advantage of 
the corporate form of ownership,  the more likely the firm will incorporate. In addition, 
(re 
— re)ro  a0) and Ia can both be of either sign.6  Each of the parameters in this 
expression  can differ by firm, leading some firms to prefer to incorporate arid others to 
remain noneorporate. 
Given the available  data, we are not in a position to examine differences in the choicea 
of organizational form made by individual firms with different characteristics.  Instead, 
we have data only on the time series for the aggregate division of firms between corpo- 
rate vs. noncorporate forms of organization. 
- In general, the outcome in any year can 
be expressed as a function of tlse joint distribution of each of the variables entering the 
expression. 
We will focus specifically on the effects of changes in the second term in equation (1). 
This term implies  that increases  in the taxes on corporate equity will encourage firms 
with taxable profits  to disineorporate  and firms with tax losses  to incorporate. Likewise, 
it implies  that an increase in the personal tax rates on nonc.orporate  firms encourages 
disincorporation of firms earniog tax losses, while encouraging partnerships with taxable 
profits to incorporate. We test these predictions in our empirical work. 
Given the continuing  puzzle concerning why firms pay dividends,  we do not attempt to model this 
choice explicitly. 
6  cao be negative for a variety of reasons.  First, even if its cx ante value were positive, its cx  poot 
value could be negative.  Seeood, for multiperiod  invcstmcnta,  expected taxable income could be  negative 
in some yoaro aod positive in others.  Third,  ceen if the real income to equity were positive, this expression 
equals the real income to the firm roieus the nominal income  to debt. Finally, even if I were positive, & 
could be negative due to the effects of accelerated  depreciation  etc. 
4 Equation (1) also implies that if firms have  losses  during some periods and profits 
during other periods, then they should  change organizational  form at the transition point. 
Similarly, if part of a firm generates negative taxable  income while the rest of the firm 
earns profits, then the firm should try to sell off  whichever part is not being taxed at the 
appropriate tax rate, so that each part can choose the more advantageous  organizational 
form. Tax shelters often seem designed to take best advantage  of these incentives. 
In subsequent work,  we will explore other testable implications  of  the theory. To begin 
with, changes in the variability  of tax rates across investors,  holding their average value 
constant (as for example occurred in 1080 with the reduction in the number of brackets) 
has predictable effects on the distribution of  firms across organizational forms. Similarly, 
changes  in the distribution of values of I, should affect  the observed distribution across 
organizational forms, holding tax rates constant.  Since theory forecasts  that corporate 
debt/equity  ratios depend on basically  the same poorly measured tax expression, r, + 
(1 
— r)T 
— r, one alternative test would be to examine the dcgree to which debt/equity 
ratios and the chosen pattern of organizational forms move  together over time in the way 
forecast by the theory.  Finally,  the theory forecasts that noncorporate investors with 
Y > Y + (1  — r)r will own  firms generating  tax losses, and conversely, forecasts which 
are testable using panel data sets of  individual tax returns, 
1.2 Tax Effects  Other Than Tax Rates 
The above discussion  focused  primarily on differences  in tax rates affecting different or- 
ganizational forms. However, there are a multitude of other tax provisions  that differ by 
organizational form.  We summarize some of these provisions,7  even  though we are in a 
position to estimate the effects of only a few of them in the empirical  work. 
Rules Governing  Election.  A business must satisfy  some restrictions  in order to avoid 
corporate taxes.  Often, for example, firms that arc legally organized  as partnerships are 
required by the IRS to pay corporate taxes.  In general,  a firm will be taxed  as a cor- 
poration unless it fails two of the following criteria: (1) continuity  of life; (2) centralized 
7  ,  For a richer  d,scuss,oa  see Scimoles ao,J Wolfson (1s87,lssS,lssl). 
5 management; (3) essy transferability  of ownership shares; (4) limited liability.2 
A firm that  is  deemed  to be a corporation under the criteria above  can still avoid 
the corporate—level tax if it qualifies  for S corporation status.  The main criteria for S 
corporation  eligibility are: (1) no more than 35 shareholders;  (2) no corporate shareholders; 
(3) not  pert of an affiliated group;  (4) only one class of stock; (5) and not a domestic 
international sales corporation  (DISC).  The ruies governing  eligibility  for S corporation 
status  have changed frequently since S  corporations were created in  1957; we will be 
examining the effects of a number of these rule changes in section 2. 
Pensions and Fringe Benefits,  Opportunities for tax—deferred savings  and fringe benefit 
deductibility  have varied across organizational  forms and  over time. For example,  partners 
an sole proprietors (unincorporated  firms with one owner and unlimited  liability) can use 
individual—oriented qualified savings plans such as Keogh accounts. Corporation pension 
funds have  different rules on deduction limits and other characteristics.  On the other 
hand, more fringe benefits provided to employees are deductible for corporations than for 
partnerships and sole proprietorships  (including, until  1986, health insurance  premiums). S 
corporations have faced corporate tax treatment of  fringes during some years, and peronai 
tax treatment during others. 
Loss Offsets  and At—Risk Rules.  One significant advantage fur partnerships and sole 
proprietorships is the ability to  offset business losses  against ether  sources  of porsonal 
income  when figuring tax liability.  A C corporation can offset  losses  only  against its 
own past or future profits—losses can offset profits in any of the prior three years,  or be 
carried forward without interest to offset future profits. The number of  years before loss 
carryforwsrds  expire has changed over time .  TIse importance of tax losses has also varied 
For murh of the lS8Os it was possible to form a master limited  partnership (MLPI that  had most of tl,c 
characteristics  of a rorporation, iocluding limited liability  for the partoers and psblirly—traded  ownership 
shares, yet was tased as a partnership. However  the U.S. 1987 tax law instituted rules that require nearly 
all master limited partnershi be taxed as corporations,  except  for the oil, gas and real estate  firms. See 
Gentry (7991) for tests of tax effects  using MLP data. 
Since  1977 five states have  legislated  limited liability companies," which hare the limited liability of 
a corporation hot  pay  no corporate-level  tax, yet also avoid most of the restrictions on  S corporations. 
'rhe  IRS took ii  years to apprnse partnership taxation for the  first of these; we do  sot yet have any data 
on their  prevalence. 
6 over time.  Before 1983 S corporation losses faced a third set of  rules; since 1983 they are 
treated the same as C corporations. 
In  1976  "at—risk" rules were applied to partnerships, restricting loss deductions to 
the amount for which an investor is personally at risk.  These rules were a response to 
the growing  use of schemes that leveraged  limited partner investments us order to sell 
large lax losses to high tax rate investors who could immediately  deduct them during the 
early years of a partnership while deferring taxes on gains until years later (when they 
were taxed at the usually lower tax rate of the  at—risk  investor).  These schemes were 
particularly prevalent for real estate and leasing deals that took advantage of  depreciation 
and interest deduction rules.  At—risk  rules were  applied  to S  corporation shareholders 
beginning in 1978. 
Passive and Foreign Income.  Before 1982 firms earning passive  or foreign—source in- 
come were not allowed to register as S corporations With the U.S.  1986 Tax Reform Act 
passive losses  accruing to partners and S corporation shareholders could be offset only 
against other sources of passive income  and not against ordinary income.  Beginning in 
1972 a C corporation could  receive favored tax treatment on export business if it qualified 
as a Domestic  International Sales Corporation (DISC).  S corporations have never been 
allowed to obtain DISC treatment. 
Reorganization Consequences.  There are at least three ways in which economic  re- 
sources can move from one form to another: through a reorganization  of an existing firm, 
through creation of new firms, or in the case of  a change from C to S corporation status  sim- 
ply through a declaration to the  IRS without legal reorganization.  The tax consequences  of 
these avenues differ.  For example,  when a C corporation wants to convert to a partnership 
or sole proprietorship, it faces recapture provisions  for the recovery of  certain tax benefits. 
but not if it elects S corporation status. Recapture is not an issue for a  newly—formed firm, 
Thus the mobility of resources  will depend on the extent to which an industry is growing, 
as well as on the amount of  previous tax benefits subject to recapture. Since the provisions 
that can lead to recapture (investment tax credits, research and development  credits, and 
accelerated depreciation) have changed several times over the past three decades,  the tax 
barriers to mobility across forms have changed as well. 
7 Capital Gains Provisions.  In general,  capital gains are taxed more favorably at the 
personal than at the corporate level, creating an incentive not to incorporate for firms 
earning substantial income  in  tlse form of capital gains.  However,  under the General 
Utilities  doctrine C corporations  coold separately incorporate an asset before it was sold 
and tlsen  distribote  tise liquidation proceeds  directly to  slsarelsolders  without incurring 
capital gains tax at the corporate level. This provision was repealed in 1986. 
When the capital gains tax rate is low enough, relative to the ordinary tax rate, tisen 
firms may have an incentive  to churn assets.  When an  asset is sold, capital gains taxes 
must be paid on the book profits, but the asset can then be depreciated based on the 
new book value. The lower the relative value of the capital gains tax rate, tlse more likely 
tlsis transaction is to be profitable.  Cisurning  can occur for firms as a whole, through ac- 
quisitions  and deacquisitions,  or can occur for particular assets, e.g.  buildings, airplanes, 
computers, etc.  The opportunities for profitable churning have varied over time — since 
1986,  they have basically  disappeared. Since  "churned" assets would normally generate tax 
losses, profitable corporations  would have had the incentive to shift ownership of "churn- 
able" assets to high—tax—bracket  noneorporate  investors during periods when churning  was 
profitable. 
A related provision  (Section  1374) was enacted in 1986 that provides slsarply different 
incentives  to new firms and existing C corporations that are considering the choice  of S 
corporation status. Under Section 1374 finns that convert to S status must pay tax at 
the top corporate rate on any "built—in gains"  realized durissg the  10 years following a 
conversion.  This was designed  to prevent firms from switching to S  status just before 
liquidation to avoid corporate—level capital gains taxation. 
Alternative Minimum  Tax.  C corporations face an alternative minimum tax (AMT) 
when taxable income  is low due to substantial tax preference  items, but for many years tins 
AMT has not been  binding on more than a few firms.  Pass—through organizational forms 
were not subject to the corporate AMT.  In 1986 a much stronger AMT was legislated. S 
corporations are not subject to this tax, which will be especially  important for firms witls 
substantial tax deferrals and accounting practices that lead to large book income relative 
to taxable income because  tlse AMT includes  50% of that difference in tlse alternative tax 
8 base. However, a new personal—level alternative minimum tax was also instituted in 1986 
and will be especially  important for tax shelter investors with substantial passive  losses. 
Summary.  It should be clear from this review that there are numerous tax rule dif- 
ferences  that are not easily captured in the formulation of equation (1) but that should 
affect the allocation of economic  resources  across  organizational forms. In our empirical 
analysis we exploit the fact that a number of these provisions  have  changed  during our 
sample period, providing us a limited opportunity to test for their effects, 
1.3 Norm—Tar Factors 
The two main explanations commonly given for a  non—tax advantage, g, to the corporate 
form of  organization are first that corporations face limited liability and  second that they 
can trade their shares publicly. How important and convincing  are these explanations? 
Limited Liability. In principle,  corporate shareholders have  limited  liability, whereas 
partners and unincorporated sole proprietors have  unlimited liability.  However,  these 
are only the "default" rules, defining the allocation of liabilities  that are not  otherwise 
allocated by explicit contracts — through recontracting, these rules can often be undone. 
For example, it is very common that the shareholders of small corperations must pledge 
personal assets if they wish to obtain external bank financing.  Partnerships, on the other 
hand, can write liability limits into contracts with  lenders, suppliers, customers and so 
forth. 
The legal difference in the default provisions concerning  liability for corporate vs. non- 
corporate firms is therefore important ouly to the degree to which explicit  recontracting 
imposes transactions costs — in some cases, these costs will be large enough that the less 
favorable rule is left in place.  Differences in these provisions are therefore more important 
when contracting costs are larger. 
Even when contracting costs prevent differences  in default liability provisions from 
being undone by explicit  contract provisions, it is still not clear whether making limited 
liability the default provision for corporations  favoes the corporate  form of  organization. To 
the extent that equity holders are better informed  than debt holders concerning  the future 
prospects for the firm, then limited liability exacerbates problems created by asymmetric 
9 information when firms try to borrow. Conversely if existing shareholders have private 
information about the firm's potential liabilities (or future prospects) not available to new 
shareholders,  then limited liability can lessen the lemons problem when shares are sold to 
new  shareholders. 
Another complication  is that some firms are taxed only at the personal level, yet still 
have limited liability. One clear example would be subchapter S corporations, Another is 
limited partnerships. In a limited partnership only the general partner—who may own no 
more than 1% of the equity capital—need  bear unlimited liability, while the limited part- 
ners are liable only to the extent of their investment, the same as corporate shareholders. 
In fact, the general partner can even be a corporation, which bears general  liability but 
only to the limit of the corporation's  wealth, with no further recourse to the corporation's 
shareholders.1° 
Public Trading of Shares.  Corporations are also claimed to have an advantage due 
to their ability to trade their shares publicly. It is widely  agreed that publicly—traded 
firms have access to lower—cost  equity capital.  In addition, publicly—traded shares may 
provide an  important instrument for the amelioration of  principal—agent problems between 
managers and owners.  This second  point bears  some discussion. In principle, a manager's 
compensation  should be tied to his contribution to the value of the firm. Given that this 
contribution is not normally observable  directly, firms in practice try to tie the manager's 
compensation  to the firm's share value, via share—purchase pension plans, stock Options, 
etc., as documented for example in Murphy (1986).  The share value used in determining 
compensation  should be based on an objective and external measure of value that is not 
subject to manipulation. A stock market should produce such an  objective valuation, but 
presumably an outside accounting firm could also do a reasonable job. In principle, this 
outside valuation is needed only once for each manager, when the manager leaves the firm, 
as for  example occurs for a sole proprietor when he sells his business. For a business of  any 
15  It may be  possible largely to undo the limited  liability distinction through this vehicle, but there 
are hidden information and moral  hazard costs because  the limited partners are not allowed to directly 
participate in omnagement without  losing partnership  tax treatment. Some moral hazard costs of limited 
partnerships are  considered  in WolIson (1985a,  1985b);  MacKie—Mason  (1987)  examines  some  hidden 
information costs. See also Felhingharn  and W01f500  (1985). 
10 size, however,  in which many of the top managers will have their pay tied to share values, 
these departures occur regularly. Obtaining careful outside valuations  in each case would 
be very costly, making it valuable to have such a valuation continually available through 
the firm's share price in the stock market.  At least large firms should therefore find the 
option to have their shares publicly traded to be of great value.  It. is certainly the case 
that large firms are much more likely to incorporate than small  firms. 
In some cases, noncorporate firms have also been able to trade their ownership shares 
publicly. For example, during much of the 1980's shares in master limited partnerships 
could be traded publicly. 
For our empirical work, the roles of limited liability and public share trading  are too 
unsettled in the theory for us to formally incorporate these effects.  However, most of our 
empirical  tests  are based on time—series  variation in the tax costs  for  different organizational 
forms. It seems plausible that the value of limited liability and public share trading have 
not covaried systematically with time—series variation in tax costs Thus, we may have a 
valid ceteris paribas experiment. 
2. Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we estimate the degree to which various  aggregate  measures of the allo- 
cation of resources and economic  activity across organizational forms lees responded as 
expected to changes  in tax incentives.  We rely on U.S. tax return data made public by 
the IRS. Individual business tax returns are not available,  so we are not able to estimate 
microeconomic  models of discrete choice among the different  organizational types. 
2.1  Overview and Data 
We use data covering the period 1959—1986.  The data were collected from numerous IRS 
publications and data tapes, and were carefully  clseckcd for accuracy.  We leave measures 
for about a dozen  income statement and balance sheet items as reported to the IRS for 
C corporations, S corporations,  partnerships and sole proprietorships. We have data for 7 
industry aggregates that correspond to the SIC 1—digit  aggregates." 
No balance  sheet  information is  collected for  sole proprietorships.  We had to remove the entire Industry 
11 For net income, losses and some other variables we have separate data for firms that 
reported positive net income and firms with losses.  Unfortnnately, the IRS does not report 
asset data separately for profit and loss firms for all organizational forms, The distinction 
between gain and loss firms is qnite important.  As discnssed in section  1, firms have an 
incentive to allocate taxable galns and losses  across organizational forms to obtaln  the 
most favorable tax treatment. Thus aggregate net income viill be a poor indicator of the 
allocation of economic  resources  and activity across organizational forms.  For example, 
suppose that when assets yield losses they are best located in partnership form, and then 
moved  to corporate form when they yield galns. Then we would see low or negative net 
income  in the partnership sector, but it would be incorrect to infer  that the partnership 
sector represents a  low (or negative!)  fraction of economic  resources  or economic activity.12 
We therefore examine net income (or deficit) separately for gain and loss firms. 
We present some  descriptive  statistics for  our  dataset in table 1. C corporations control 
a dominant fraction of business  assets in the U.S,'3 hut  report receiving  roughly only 
two—thirds of business income  (both positive income and tax losses).  In particular,  C 
corporations controlled  an asset base  over 18 times larger than partnerships, yet reported 
on average  less than three times as  much in losses.  Partnershipa and S corporations seem to 
have been biased towards  loss activities;  e.g., the mean partnership share of total  losses was 
more than two times as large as the partnership share of gains.  The standard deviations 
of each form of organization's share of the annual totals, calculated over  1959—1986,  are 
also listed in table 1.  These changes over tinie have been  quite modest, with the largest 
variation occuring for firma reporting tax losses. 
How nmcl, movement  should we have seen across organizational forms  during our sam- 
ple period due to tax changes? We focus on estimating the effects of changes  in the average 
1—Agricoltore, Forestry  sad Fishing—from all of oar  data, leaving us only 7ef  the 8 standard SIC iadostry 
aggregates,  because some necessary farm information  was net reported by the IRS daring the 1980s. 
12  In fact, reported  net ineeme frem all partnerships was negative  from 1981 threoghi 1986. 
13  Sale prapriatarshiw are net required  ta file balance  sl,eetn, and tlias we are forced to eaclode them 
from ealcolationo  based an asset data. If we assame that sole proprietorships  earn the same mean rate of 
returnee  assets as do partnershijw then soie proprietorships  would  have 15% of total assets in the economy 
and the corporate share would fall to 80%.  This is al,oost  surely an acereotiniate  for sole praprietorohips. 
12 value each year of the relative tax treatment of corporate vs. noncerporate income, as mea- 
sured by r0 +  (1— 
— r5.14  Any estimate  of these relative tax rates  will inevitably have 
error. We deal with this by constructing four different series under differesit assumptions. 
Our results are very robust to the chuice uf tax pric. seres and instruments (described 
below). 
Our series  were constructed as follows.  TI Ise measure of the corporate tax rate, 
defined to equal the ratio of tax payments to taxable income,  should take into account 
the progressivity  of the corporate tax rate structure, as well as the asymmetric loss offset 
provisions.15  In  the results reported below,  we used two crude measures: the highest 
statutory  marginal rate in a given year, and ti.e realized average  tax rate in the IRS data 
(income tax liability I taxable income).'6 17 
For the personal tax rate on ordinary income (r,,), we need a representative tax rate 
for those potentially investing in noncorporate  husisiesses.  These are generally  upper tax 
bracket individuals. One approach to approximate this tax rate is to look at the represen- 
tative tax rate on municipal bonds, another asset purchased primarily by those in upper 
tax brackets. We use an estimate of this implicit tax rate calculated by Kochin and Parks 
(1988) and Potcrba (1989) by comparing the yields on Treasury and municipal bonds. We 
also construct a r5 series using the highest statutory marginal personal tax rate in each 
year. 
As seen ,n equation (1), the net csrporate tas rate e,+(1 —r,)r. plays  an additissal role to the estent 
that  is nonzero.  Given our diflicolty in coming up with a convincing story that nenras factors should 
he inportant, we fnc,,sed en the d,ffcrenc'w in the tas treatment  ef business income I. Wed0 teat for an 
icdcpendent  role of Ta + (1 — r4c5 in some of the ccsults. 
As shown in Altsholer and Ao,.rbe.ch (1990)  the tas code's asymmetric  treatrncnt  of tax losses can 
have a significant effect on the effective tas ratc  faciog a fir,n. 
In an earlier version of the paper we also oscd an effective marginal tax rate calcutmated  by Anerbach 
(1983).  Althoogh  this mea.sores unprovcs on the statotory rate by adjostisg for accelerated  depreciation  and investment  tax credits, it does ,,nt incorporate  the salue of asymmetric  loss treatment. Our average  realized rate approximately  accounts  for all such  provisions.  Further, the Aucrbacl,  series ends in 1982. 
For tl,cse reasons we only  report results from  using fnur tax price serim,  not six.  llnwever,  the results 
usisg tIme  Anerbach  series strongly cnnflrmcd our stlicr results and thus empl.acizc the r&ustncss of the 
analysis. 
17  'IIi's latter definition makes use of the aggrcgatc  data on corporate  taxable  income, creating an en- 
dngene,ty  problem  when these same data are used  in constructing the dcpendcnt  variable.  We eliminate 
army  bias  in  the estimation  through use of instru,ncntal  variables. In any cam', the pcnhlrm  is mud, less 
i,ipnrtaiit when looking at industry rather than aggrcgsm e data. 
13 To estimate the personal tax rate on equity income we assume that the fraction d of 
nominal income accruing to equity holders takes the form of dividends, and that capital 
gains are always realized long—term. Then Te = dr0 + (I — d)yar,, where  -y measures the 
fraction of  long—term gains that are tsxable. and a is an adjustment to make the capital 
gains tax rate  "accrual equivalent" to capture the benefits from deferring accruing tax 
liabilities until the asset is sold plus  the benefits from the capital gains tax exemption 
on assets still held at death. Following Feldstein,  Dicks—Mireaux, and Poterba (1983), we 
assume that a  = O.25,' We  estimated  by taking the ratio of  corporate dividend payments 
to after—tax corporate profits as reported in the National Income and Product Accounts. 
We use the statutory time—series  for  the capital gains exclusion,  -y. 
With two different measures of both r  and r (the latter are used to construct two 
corresponding  measures  of re) we have a total of four different  time—series measures of the 
relative tax price on corporate assets. The series are shown in figure 1. The main  difference 
between them is in the level, but we are interested more in how the tax incentives have 
changed over time. We always include a time trend (and time squared) in our regressions; 
after removing these trends from  the tax price series all six are positively  s.nd substantially 
correlated.  In any case, we estimate all of our regressions  four times, once with each 
series, and used instruments to eliminate any bias due to measurement  errors, to check the 
robustness of our results.'9 
Figure 1 also reveals a smshstantial amount of time-series variation in the tax incentives 
for different organizational forms.  It is a truism in the U.S.  enspirieal  public finance 
literature that one cannot estimate regressions  using the corporate tax rate because it has 
changed so little in the post—war era.  However, the tax price incentive for allocation of 
15  Recent research  on opti,aal  trading  strategies  soggests that the effects of thc tax trestment of capital 
gains may be far  more complicated that what can b-s captored with an estimated  vs  that is constant ever 
time. See Gordon and Machie—Masoo (Issi) for forther  discussion. 
15  Our instrumental  variables procedure  works as follows. Let the different onderlying  data series we use 
for constructing  corporate tas rates be called (CI, C2), and use (PI,P2) for the personal  tax  rate series. 
Then we have one tax price variable,  called TPI, constructed using (Cs,Pl), and another, TP4 using 
(C2, P2) (and likewise for TP2 and TP2). We assume that the sources of measurement  error in the series 
(C2, P2) are  independent  of the errors in (Cl, P1). Then, TP4 is correlated  with TPI because they are 
both measuring the same true tax  price, but 7'P4  is uncorrelated  with the measurement  error in TPI, 
making it a valid instru,neut. This procedure provides us with four tax variables, each of which serves  as 
a valid instrument for one of the others. 
14 resources  across organizational  forms depends on the personal tax rates on ordinary and 
equity income as well, causing the incentive to vary substantially over time. 
2.2 Tar Price Regressions 
In order to test the covariation  between  tax incentives and ownership  structure we esti- 
mated linear regressions  for a measure of the allocation of  economic  resources or activity 
on a constant, a time trend,  time squared and one of the four tax price measures. Our 
first results are given in table 2, for the fraction of total assets held by C corporations, 
for the sample of all returns.  We report only the tax price coefficient from 12 different 
specifications,  suppressing the constant and time trend coefficients.  Each row reports re- 
gressions  using one of the four measures  of the tax price; each column represents a different 
estimation method. 
The results are  very clear and consistent. Regardless  of the measure  of the tax price, the 
use of  instruments or the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, there is a negative and 
in every case highly statistically precise relation between  the tax price and the fraction of 
assets hcld by C  corporations. The mean t—ratios  for the three different methods (columns) 
are 4.15, 4.05, and 3542a The higher is the tax disadvantage  of C corporate ownership, 
the lower is the fraction of assets held by corporations." 
The effects are not large, however.  Based on the mean of the IV estimates, —0.0502, 
reducing i- (or ralsing r  +  (1— r)r) by .10 would lead to only a one—half  of  one percent- 
age point decrease in the fraction of assets held by C corporations. To roughly account 
for adjustment lags we also estimated the model with a lagged dependent variable (this 
specification would  arise  from a Koyclc adjustment lag process). Based on the mean of 
the tax price and lagged dependeut variable coefficients the long run decrease  in thc C 
corporation asset share still would be only  0.55 percentage points. 
20  Obviously the uean t-ratios reported  cannot be used for strict hypothesis  testing. The  detailed  results 
are available  upon request. 
21  Wc undertook  another  test for  the robustness  of tl,ese estimates.  The dependent  variable  as specified 
has a limited  ,stge,  since the fraction is bounded  by definition between zero and one. We re--estimated 
the equations using the log—odds ratin  (ln(y)/(1 
— ln(y))) which, ranges  on the real line, with  essentially 
the same results for all four tas prices,  using both OhS and IV. 
15 Our theory tells us that tax rate changes should  have opposite effects  oo profitable and 
unprofitable  firms.  Unfortunately,  asset data are not separately available for gain and loss 
firms.  We do have separate data on taxable income (loss) for gain (loss) firms,  however. 
Table 3 presents our results for gain and loss firms,  aggregated across industries.22 We 
report only the tax price coefficient from eight different regressions. Once again the results 
are clear and consistent.  Regardless of the tax price explanatory variable, the fraction of 
tax losses reported by C corporations significantly  increases as the relative corporate tax 
rate increases. As predicted, gains are shifted in the opposite direction as the corporate 
tax rate increases.  All of  the t—ratios are very high. 
The magnitude of income and loss  shifting reported in table 3 is higher than that 
estimated for assets in table 2. For example, at the mean for deficit firms, reducing r,, by 
.10 would lead to a short—ron  shift of  losses by about fi.2 percentage  points. For gain firms 
tise corresponding  shift  of income would be about —5.5 percentage points. 
The results are reinforced when we estimate the gain/loss regressions  on disaggregated 
industries, reported in table 4.  We report the mean results from four different  tax price 
regressions  for each  of seven industries, split by loss and  gain firms.23 The  pattern  of  shift- 
ing is strong and consistent  across nearly ail industries. The results are strongest for loss 
firms, however. Wlsen the relative  tax on corporations  rises taxable losses shift significantly 
toward C corporations in every industry except Services.  Taxable gains are shifted away 
from C corporations in five industries (although with high statistical significance  in only 
one);  the slsift is close to zero in Transportation, and is significantly  positive for Finan- 
cial and Real Estate, which is one of the only unexpected results in all of our analyses.24 
Although the effects arc mostly consistent and for losses  quite statisticaily significant,  the 
magnitudes are not very large. 
22  For  this  and all further  asalyses  is the paper we  report only results frem instrumental  variables 
estimators. 
23  For example,  the coefficient  and t-ratio reported for deficit mining  firms (O.g54,2.25)  are the  means 
from four regressions, each using  a different one  of  our  four tax price measures, appropriately instrumented. 
24  We have no strong explanation  for this one anomalous  result. However,  given  tl,e peculiarities in the 
rules determining taxable income  for banks,  and the many tax  arbitrage schemes revolving around real 
estate, we are not too surprised  that our  simple theory is not entirely adequate  in  this sector. 
16 We noted in section  2 that we might be able to control for some of the non—tax in 
fiueoces on choice of organizational  form by comparing C and S corporations, since both 
are corporations and share many similar characteristics (including limited liability). We 
estimated gains and losses reported by C corporations as a share of total gains and losses 
for C and S corporations, and report the results in table 5.  Both gains and losses suove 
significantly between C and S corporations, in the direction predicted. Since the distinc- 
tion between C and S corporations inure directly focuses on tax rules than other factors 
tisese results provide strong support for our overall conclusions. 
We undertook several further analyses to verify the robustness of our resislts.  For 
example, we estimated our regressions  using the number of returns filed (rather than the 
magnitude of  assets, gains  and  losses) as our dependent variable.  The tax price effects held 
strongly among loss firms  for movements  between C corporations  and other firms, and also 
for movements  between  C and S corporations; the estimates were insignificantly  different 
from  zero for gain firms.  Also, as in table 2, we re-estimated all of the regressions  with a 
lagged dependent variable, without any systematic or important effect on the results. We 
tried including GNP as a regressor but that had no significant  impact on the results. 
We also tested  our restriction that the coefficients on the corporate and personal tax 
costs are the same (except for sign). In particular, we re-estimated the regressions  in table 
4 entering the two tax variable components separately and performed a Wald test for the 
null hypothesis. For loss firms, the difference between the coefficients on the corporate and 
personal tax costs was insignificant on average  across all of  the regressions, for all industries 
except Mining.  For gain firms, however,  the difference was significant  on average for all 
industries except Mining and Construction. This suggests that non-tax factors, g, mny be 
more important at the margin for gain firms (see equation (1)).  However, there was no 
systematic pattern to tIme differences between  the tax variable coefficients, and tIme general 
conclusions about the effects of taxes on organizational form were supported. 
Altogether we have found very strong evidence  that both assets and annual gains and 
losses are shifted  across organizational  forms in response to changes in the relative tax costs 
nnposed on those forms.  It seems safe to conjecture that the evidence for asset shifting 
would  be even  stronger if we could distinguish between time  assets of gain and loss firms, 
17 since the incentives go in opposition directions for those groups. The magnitudes of the 
effects are measured  very consistently  across a wide variety of models using different  defini- 
tions of the tax price, both OLS and IV estimation, aggregate and industry—disaggregated 
data, and when subjected to several other robustness checks. 
2.3 Magnitude of the Effects 
Tax effccta on the allocation of activity  across  organizational forms appear to be very 
statistically significant.  However, the magnitudes seem rather  small: a 0.10 reduction  in 
the corporate tax rate anneara to shift only 0,5 percent of assets towards C corporations; 
the same larga tax rednction  only shifts about 5% of  gains and loaaes across  forms. Are 
those shifts economically significant? 
Ideally, vie would like to use onr results to estimate tbe marginal excess burden from 
double corporate taxation. Tbis excess burden would arise due to firma with  g > 0 choosing 
not to incorporate, and  conversaly for  firma with g <0, due to tax factors. Aggregate data 
are insufficient,  however, to estimate tlda excess burden. For example,  even if  g were always 
equal to zero so that there can be no exceas burden from changes in organizational form, 
firma would atill sort themselves among  partnership and corporate forms of ownership 
an as to minindse collectively their tax obligations.25  in general,  we conjecture that in 
equilibrium  there are two personal tax rate cutoffs,  withs very profitable/low  g firms owned 
as  partnerships by low—tax—rate investors,  and high loss/low g firma owned  as partnerships 
by highs—tax—rate investors. The ingher the typical values of  g, the further these test rate 
cutoffs  would  he from the point at which  = r  (1 
— rc)re.  The tax rate cutoffs  will 
also vary in complicated  ways with ehangea in the wealth distribution, in the distribution 
of firm profitability,  and in the tax rate schedules. 
Cravehle and Ketlikoff  (1990) (hereafter CX) have simulated the exceaa burden from 
corporate taxation in a muals aimnpier  setting in which r  and the taxable rate of return 
to capital are the same for all  firma and r0 is the same for all investors, but  in which 
25  This sitaaties ws,,id be directly  aaalsgeus  te the Miller (1977) nmedel ef equilibrium corporate  financisi 
structure. 
18 partnership and corporations  produce  goods which are imperfect substitutes in demand.26 
They report an excess burden of  more than 100% of the revenucs raised. These estimates, 
however, are based on totally implausible  forecasts  of the fraction of  firms that are initially 
corporate and the sensitivity  of the composition of  firms across organizational forms to tax 
factors. 
To show this, we have replicated the model simulations  iss CR (1990) in order to deter- 
mine how much shifting of assets must occur between corporations and noncorporations 
to generate the high excess burdens they report.  CR  esnphasize the case in which  they 
assume unitary substitution elasticities  in production and a demand substitntion elastic- 
ity of 30 between goods  produced by corporations and noncorporations  within the same 
industry; the excess borden in this case is 109% of the tax revenuc  collected. However, in 
this case, thc corporate share of total assets starts at the implausibly  low figure of 36%, 
then jumps  to 99% if the corporate tax is removed. Even when the demand snbstitution 
elasticity is only 10, and tlsc excess burden is "only"  about 40% of revcnncs, the corporate 
share of assets is predicted by their model to junsp to 73% if the corporate tax is removed. 
The Statistics of  Income data  show, in contrast, that on average 93.8% of  assets had been 
corporate during the period 1959—86, while  our estimates forecast that tile corporate share 
would increaso by  2.5% if a 45% corporate tax rate were set to zero.  In any case, our 
measured tax price series varies substantially during our time per od  as seen in Figure 1 
yet the maximum and minimum  corporate shares of total assets differ by less than 7 per- 
centage points over  1959—86, compared to the massive slufts the CR model would predict 
with that much tax price variation. 
2.4  Other Tar Factors 
In section 1.2 we discussed  a number of other tax rules that can affect the incentive to 
locate assets in particular organizational  forms, but that are difficult  to summarize in a 
measure of the tax rate incentive,  In this section  we report the results of our efforts to 
26 
They  hsse a closely related  model in Gl<  (1989)  in  which demand for corporate and noncorporste 
goods is identical but firm production functions  differ.  The escess burdc,  results arc quite similar in the 
two papers. 
19 determine whether some non—tax--rate changes  in tax rules had significant effects on the 
allocation  of economic resources and activities across organizational forms, 
We have  developed a chronology  of significant tax policy  changes  hetween 1958 and 
1986 that we helie'e may have affected  the choice of organizational  form without directly 
affecting one of our tax rate variables.27  From a long list of changes (in nearly every year) 
we have selected 4 years in which  the changes  seem to have a strong and  clear impact on the 
direction  of the tax incentives, and a 5th year in which the changes were clearly important 
but had effects in two directions making it difficult  to predict cx ente the magnitude or 
direction  of the effects. We describe  these policy  changes in table 6. Most of the changes 
concern rules for S cerf a rations, so we previde orsr prediction of the changes in the fraction 
of activity in C corpere"ienc  relative to S corporations, and in the fraction of S corporate 
activity te all pass—thr -gb organizations.28  Because S corporations were first permitted 
in 1957, we study the effect  of these rule changes only for the period 1965—1986 to avoid 
the problems of the "start-up" transition towards S corporations.29 
Most of the changes were liberalizations of the restrictions on S cerporatinns, so we 
expect  a shift  of resources  and activity away from C and toward S  corporations.  The 
'-banges in  1983 beth liberalized and further restricted S corporations, so we expect  the 
effects to be ambiguous.2° 
IFs tested for the effects of  these policy changes cc  tie- allocation of  assets and incnme 
a extending our tax price regressions  reported abee  1) a basic model was to use three 
27  We are gratef,d  to Linda Burilovich for her eseellent  assistanc' in r reparing  this chronology. 
Mast of the chaeges should  be self—explanatory, or  were explained  in section  1-2 of the paper. One 
esceptino  is the debt reelaasiflcstion relaxation  for S corporations  in 1973. When corporations—C  or 5— 
harrow  substantial  sums from their shareholders,  there is a risk that the IRS will deem those loans to be 
the taxable equivalent of non—voting  equity  shares,  thereby ruling  the "interest" payments to be dieideods 
aod ineligible for the interest  deduction.  Since  S corporations  were allowed to have only one class  of stock, 
debt reclassification could make  a corporation  ineligible for S atatus.  Since the interest payments  were 
taxable to the shareholders  at the same  tax rates as  pass—through equity earnings,  the IRS essentially 
stopped debt reelassitieatinns  fur S corps in 1973, making S status more viable for many firms. 
29  Graphical  analysis of the data suggested that the startup transition ran from  about 1957—1964.  Our 
time-pected dummy  estimates  are quite sensitive to the presence of this secular trend in  the early years. 
Tl,e various  changes  we study all have  the flavor of raising  or  lowering barriers to entry, all else 
constant. Thus, the predicted  effects are the same for b0th gain and loss firms,  when S corporation  rules 
are hherahised, 100cc activity of beth sorts should  moee to S corporate  form. 
20 stage least squares to estimate a system of tax price regressions  across the seven industry 
disaggregates, allowing nil of the coefficients to vary hy industry as in the regressions 
reported in table 4. We added dummy variables  as intercept sbifts for the policy  changes; 
to obtain sufficient degrees  of freedom  we restricted the policy  dummy coefficients to be 
tbe same across all 7 industry equations. Since the pohcy changes were permanent, the 
dummies were coded  to be  one for all years subsequent to the initial year, and zero for all 
years before. Thus each coefficient estimate represents the average permanent change in 
the dependent variable following the policy change. 
The results are reported in table 7. The dependent variables are first, the fractions of 
C corporate assets, income and losses relative to S corporations;  and second, the fractions 
for S corporation relative to partnerships and sole proprietorships. In each table we report 
the tax policy dummy variable  estimates for the fraction of assets (all returns), the fraction 
of net income (returns with positive net income) and the fraction of losses (returns with 
losses).3' 
The results are clear and consistent across specifications.  The policy ehangcs in 1969, 
1982 and to a  lesser extent 1976 had the predicted effects on the allocation  of  asscts, income 
and deficits between C and S corporations, with strong statistical significance.  The debt 
reclassification  relaxation  for  S corporations  in 1973 seems to have had no discernible  effect. 
The 1983  mix of changes  shifted taxable gains towards S corporations,  but had no effect on 
assets or lusses. It is not dear why only the allocation of  gains should have been  affected; 
if anytbing, we expected the allocation of deficits  to be more affected  by the unlimited 
flow—through loss carryover granted to S corporations. 
Thc results for S corporations  versus partnerships and sole proprietorships are similar, 
but somewhat weaker.  Both 1969 and  1982 show  the predicted  effect with strong statistical 
significance.  No clear pattern is dc'nonstrated for  citlser 1973 or 1976; the two statistically 
significant estimates for 1973 have the predicted sign,  but  the cvidence  for 1976 tends 
weakly against the prediction. The 1983 mix of  policies seemed to have zero net effects. 
'  For brevity  we report  only the results using ane of  tise four tas price  measures (TP4); the results  were 
essentially  the same for each tax price variable. 
21 The allocation of assets, gains, and losses  across organizational forms responded as 
predicted to these important changes in the rules.  However, all of the estimated effects 
were rather  small. 
2.4 The  US. 1986 Tax Reform  Act 
The U.S. 1986 Tax Reform Act probably contained the most important changes in both 
tax rate and other tax incentives for the choice of organizational form during our entire 
sample period. Unfortunately,  corporate income tax data for 1987 and 1988 have not been 
released by the IRS as of this writing, and we are thus unable to do a thorough analysis 
of inspact of this law.  None  of tise results reported thus far in the paper reflect any data 
after 1986.  However, we have been able to obtain some information that suggests large 
shifts across organizational  forms after 1986.32 
The most obvious change  is that the personal tax rate was cut by more than  the 
corporate rate, and in fact the top personal marginal tax rate was lower than the corporate 
rate for the first time in the modern era. This will raise the relative tax price on the C 
corporate form and should  have  induced profitable assets to move  towards pass—through 
forms.  Another important  change  was tlse repeal of the General Utilities  doctrine for 
corporations, which was an important  vehicle for avoiding a double  capital gains tax on 
asset sales.  The tough now alternative minimum tax on C corporations  should also have 
shifted activity.  On the other hand,  passive  loss restrictioos and the higher floors on 
allowable  personal deductions for medical and other  expenses are unfavorable to  pass— 
through organizations. 
One observation possible with data currently available is that there was a lsuge surge 
in the number of  corporations  filing to obtain S status. During the first six months of  1987 
there were about 375,000 filings, compared to an average  aix—month rate of about 150,000 
during 1983—1986. The  filing rate has continued to be  higher than before  for  each half  year 
through 1988. 
Another striking fact concerns the aggregate net income reported by S corporations 
and partnerships.  From 1981 to 1986  this net income averaged —$2.2  billion.  In  1987 
32  For a more co,optete  discussien, see Gordon and MacKie—Mason  (1901). 
22 net income jumped to positive  $32 billion.  This is consistent with the elimination of any 
investors with personal tax rates exceeding the effective tax rate on corporate income — 
with a relatively higher corporate tax, income should be shifted towards pass—through 
organizations and losses should move towards C corporations. 
3. Conclusion 
Our basic  hypothesis  is simple:  taxes should induce profitable firms to shift out of the 
corporate sector when  the tax distortion to incorporating is larger, and conversely for 
firms with tax losses.  We presented a model showing how the choice of organizational 
form depends on the relative tax treatment of corporate and noncorporate  firms. We also 
identified  a number of  tax policy features that are important for the choice of  organizational 
form but which  could  not, be summarized  in an  observable  tax price measure, and  discussed 
non-tax factors that may affect the choice of  organizational form. 
Our  empirical  evidence is quite strong and consistent: assets, taxable gains and taxable 
losses all shift across organizational  forms in response to changes in tax rate and other tax 
policy incentives. We tested a wide variety of specifications using different  measures of 
the tax incentives, different  forms of the dependent variable, and different  econometric 
methods, and throughout obtained highly statistically significant  estimates that support 
the basic hypothesis. We also found that some of the major non-tax-rate policy changes 
that we identified caused  significant  shifts in the predicted directions  between C and S 
corporations, and between S corporations, partnerships and proprietorships. Some of the 
policy changes seemed to have no effect, but none that we tested had consistently  significant 
effects that contradicted our predictions. 
All measured  effects are small,  however, throwing doubt on the economic importance of 
tax-induced changes in organizational  form. It  appears that transactions  costs and non-tax 
factors affecting the  choice of  organizational form arc dominant, 
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See  text for  tax price definitions. 
Figure 1 
Estimated Tax Cost of Corporate Form 
1959  1964  1969  1974  1979  1984 
Year Table 1: Assets, Income and Losses By Organizabonal Form 
1959-1986 
Mean  Std. Dev. 
Assets, all returns 
Total Assets  8050.6  27442 
% C corporation  93.8%  2.1% 
% S corporation  11%  0.2% 
% partnership  5.1%  2.0% 
Income, firms with net  income 
Total Income  405.4  84.0 
% C corporation  66.9%  3.6% 
% S corporation  2.1%  0.8% 
% partnership  10.1%  1.9% 
% sole proprietorship  20.8%  3.4% 
Loss, firms with loss 
Total Loss  86.1  65.9 
% C corporation  57.5%  7.8% 
% S corporation  4.5%  0.9% 
% partnership  23.5%  10.0% 
% sole proprietorship  14.5%  3.8% 
Su,oe IRS Slathbco of roome  pubhcations. 
f4oIe: Toldo  ore  I,, b5oos of  1982 dolforo.  PorcorUo  goc  the  rr,000 or,d  olondord dodolioo kr oocf,  fooo'o  chore 
of  the tof  000r th.e; e,  the C corporaIio chore of totel  ossete hod c  93.8% reoon ord 2.1% ctei,dard  deviotton. Table 2 
Estimated Tax Price Effects on the  Fraction of  Assets Held By C Corporations 
All firms (aggregated) except agriculture, forestry, fishing 
Tax price  OLS  IV 
IV, Lagged 
Dependent Variable 































t. t-rattoo  based on White's boteroekedeotio-eons'etent  standard errors are  in r.erantheees. N/eons  are  the erithrnetie 
means ci  the  eoelrsderrta  sorb  t-rettes in the  column above. 
2. Tea pdca  veoialdes  ere  bterrhTad  by the  source used  to obtain the  roergirrel  too rete  for corporattoneliodtedueto 
(respectively). 'star '  statutory:  'eel  ecereee  tea rate based  on 501 data  )rederei booms  ted ret  pre-tee 
breams): 'bore '- bond  'b  personal tea  rate  from  Kochmn end Fobs (tetiff) end Poterbe (toss).  Ore 
other corbanetmo omiebtee  worse  constant, ohms freed end time squared. 
3. bach reported coetthdent  is the  too prbe ccetibbent fran a  different regrssdun  (t 2 reresaiens  eve 
reported in ttOs tabs). 
4. lot rrrgrcsoiorro  based  rrn 27 ebseroetons, t ttta-t  Salt (partnership  esset date 'a oneodleble tort 900). Table 3 
Estimated  Tax Price Effects on the Fraction of Gains and Losses 
Reported by C Corporations 
All firms (aggregated) except agriculture, forestry, fishing 
Tax price  Deficit Firms  Gain Firms 
TP1: stat/stat  1.00  -0.721 
(6.37)  (3.09) 
TP2: sol/stat  0.646  -0.560 
(7.30)  (3.60) 
TP3: stat/bond  0.957  -0.548 
(8.05)  (4.73) 
TP4: sd/bond  0.589  -0.355 
(7.52)  (3.36) 
Means  0.799  -0.546 
(7.31)  (3.70) 
Notes 
1. t-qatos based  ci Wbae  heerododastc-consbaerfl  stasdard  errors are  io parentheses.  Moarrs are the 
arithmetic  means of the  coefficients  and t-rstios In the  oolomn  above. 
2.  See note 2, table  2, for  variable definitions. 
3. Each  reported  coeftiolent  5 the tax price coeffioierrt  from a  ditlerent  regression  18 regressions are 
reported te this  table). 
4. Alt regressions based  on 28  observations,  1959-1986,  Each regression estimated with  instrsetontal  variables. Table 4 
Estimated Tax Price Effects on Fraction of  Gains and Losses 
Reported by C Corporations 
By Industry 
Industry  Deficit Firms  Gain Firms 



































r. t-ro  bed  Whites heterosked  occetsistertt standard errors are  in parentheses. 
2. See note 2, teble  2,  for  verieble definitions. 
3,  Each  noty In the  toble is the meerr from  foor regressions  using the four different  tax price variables 
(84  regren.sorns are  surnmmerized in this table). 
4. All regronalons based os2B  obserootions,  t958-t986. 84  regressions  estimated WI  rrerbll variables. Table 5 
Estimated Tax Effects on the Allocation of  Assets, Income and Losses 
Between C and S Corporations 
All firms (aggregated) except agriculture, forestry and fishing 
Tax Price  Losses  Gains 
TP1: stat/stat  0.361  -0.0953 
(5.94)  (2.03) 
TP3: sol/stat  0.244  -0.0825 
(5.59)  (2.65) 
TP4: stat/bond  0.291  -0.1 
(4.54)  (2.44) 
TP6: soi/bond  0.165  -0.079 
(4.83)  (2.13) 
Means  0.265  -0.0893 
(5.23)  (2.31) 
Notes: 
1. t-re  w!itos heteroskodestio-coeisterO stends,d  orom  ore ri peronthoses.  Mearrs  are  arithmeti 
means  of the coefficrerite  arid f-ratios ia the  column  above. 
2. See note 2. table 2 for  variable detintions. 
3.  Each  reported cocifrolerit  te the  1ev price coefficient  from a dflererrt regression (12 regressions  are 
reported in this tabte) 
4. Jl regressions based  on 26 obsomationis,  1959-1986,  Each regression was estimated with instrumentat  carla Table 6 
Major Non-Rate  Tax Policy Changes 
Expected  Effect on: 
C/  sd 
Year  Changes  (C + SC)  (SC + P + SP) 
1966  Reduced risk of reclassification  of S corp debt as  -  + 
stock when debt is held proportionally  by  owners 
1969  S corps allowed to use Keogh-like  qualified  pension  -  + 
plans, putting them on parity with partnerships  and 
sole proprietorships 
1973  Debt reclassification  restriction  on S corps almost  -  + 
completely relaxed 
1976  At-risk rules implemented,  primarily for partnerships  + 
1982  (a) NewS corps cannot own subsidiaries;  (b) limit  -  + 
on S corp shareholders  raised to 20; (c) limit removed 
on S corporation foreign Income;  (d)  limit removed 
on S corporation passive income; (e) C corporation loss 
carryforward  extended  from 7 to 15 years 
1983  (a)  S corps restored to pension plan parity  with C 
corps; (b)  S corp shareholder  limit raised  to 35; 
(c) S corps granted unlimited  flow-through  loss 
carryovers; (d)  S corps restricted  on fringe 
deductions by shareholder-employees Table 7 
Estimated Non-Rate Tax Policy Changes on Fraction of Assets and Income 
Model  1969  1973  1976  1982  1983 
Assets  (a/I  firms) 
C  Corporations versus S  Corporations 
-0.00795  0.0024  0.00594  -0.00721  -0.0014 
(4.21)  (1.26)  (4.18)  (2.71)  (0.623) 
Income (gain firms)  -0.0172  0.00532  0.00966  -0.0159  -0.0155 
(3.32)  (1.02)  (2.47)  (2.17)  (2.52) 
Deficit (loss firms)  -0.0201  0.0183  -0.00509  -0.0313  0.0106 
(2.70)  (2.43)  (0,909)  (2.98)  (1.20) 
Assets (al/firms) 
S Corporations versus Partnerships and Sole  Proprietorship 
0.0604  -0.00707  -0.0166  0.0579  0.00218 
(3.36)  (0.390)  (1.23)  (2.29)  (0.102) 
Income (gain  firms)  0.0392  -0.00648  -0.0157  0.0621  0.00361 
(3.88)  (0.635)  (2.06)  (4.36)  (0.301) 
Deficit (loss  firms)  -0.00131  -0.0383  -0.00508  0.0440  0.00343 
(0.039)  (1.31)  (0.264)  (0.895)  (0.0834) 
Notes: 
1. t.ralios  based  on White's  heteroskodas8c-consisterrt  standard  errors are  w porenthonos. 
2. See note  2, table  2, for variable deitrritions. 
3. Each row reports  just  the c efterierris on the tax  pcticy  change  dummy  vsnsblo,  tore  sirrglo regression  (6  regressions 
are  reported  in this Ibid. The  tax pose  used  as  an explanatory  varieblo was  TP4 
4. All regressions  bsssd  on 154 observations  for seven industries  over 1965-1980.  Modvls were  e6rrrstnd  using  3SLS, with 
equality  restrictions  on the  tax policy  change  damnmies  across the  equations.  TPI won used  o.s We  rrstrumsont  for TIM. 